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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of environmental control on income distribution and welfare for an 
open economy with inbound tourism. The pollution input is considered as a mobile factor between 
sectors, and a rise in it raises the wages of skilled labor in the traded sector but can weaken the 
wages of unskilled labor in the non-traded sector. Thus, lax policy on environmental controls can be 
a source of rising wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. In addition, loosened 
environmental control lowers the price of the non-traded good and thus reduces the revenue from 
tourism exports. Stricter controls on pollution emissions can therefore narrow the wage gap and 
promote residents’ welfare. Nonetheless, to improve the production efficiency of the non-traded 
good sector, permit prices of emissions may need to be lower under imperfect competition. 
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Introduction 
Tourism is a growing and important industry in both developed and developing countries.  
For example, tourism contributes more than 10 percent of GDP for many economies. It is 
also an important source of earning foreign exchange and provides employment 
opportunities for domestic labor.1  Generally, tourist consumption in the receiving country 
is predominantly of non-traded goods and services.  In an effort to attract tourists, phrases, 
such as Incredible India, Korea Sparkling, Malaysia Truly Asia, Uniquely Singapore, have 
been used. 
However, the utility of visiting may be mitigated by increased environmental 
problems.  This is especially the case for small island tourism economies (SITEs) that have 
delicate ecosystems.  For many SITEs the growing tourism industry can strain existing 
resources, leading to congestion, degrading the quality of tourism services and lowering the 
attractiveness of the SITE as a tourism destination (Mohan, Nabin and Sgro, 2007). For 
instance, tourists often complain about the worsened air quality in Hong Kong. 
Environmental concerns for sustaining development and promoting tourism have therefore 
become a top priority for these economies. 
There is a substantial body of work on the welfare effect of environmental controls 
for the small and large open economies.  Environmental pollution harms consumers. 
According to the user pay principle, the optimal price of pollution emissions should be set 
equal to the direct marginal damage of pollution to consumers.  However, in the presence 
of tourism, this pricing rule may need to be modified. Since the destination economy has its 
monopoly power on its non-traded goods, the presence of tourism creates a demand 
distortion (cf. Hazari and Sgro, 2004). A rise in tourism can increase welfare of domestic 
residents via the so-called tourism terms-of-trade effect. This effect in turn affects the 
pricing of pollution emissions. In order to capture the welfare benefit from tourism, we will 
show that the optimal price of pollution emissions needs to exceed its direct marginal 
damage to consumers. However, this result needs to be further modified when imperfect 
competition prevails in the non-traded sector. 
On the other hand, in the wage-gap literature, the rising inequality between skilled 
and unskilled wages has  attracted a lot of attention. This wage inequality can be caused by 
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trade liberalization (Wood, 1995; Leamer, 1998; Marjit, et al., 2003; Xu, 2003; Tokarick, 
2005), technological difference (Davis, 1998; Franscois and Nelson, 1998), outsourcing 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996), and foreign competition (Neary, 2002).  Tokarick (2005), 
using a CGE model with non-traded sectors for the U.S. economy, shows that expanding 
trade by lowering trade distortions such as tariffs actually reduces wage inequality.        
The purpose of this paper is to examine the distributional and welfare effects of 
environmental control for an open economy with inbound tourism. Lax pollution control 
encourages the production of the non-traded good, causing the price of the non-traded good 
to fall. Unskilled workers may suffer if they are the specific factor in the non-traded sector. 
The loosened environmental policy can widen the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
labor.  Furthermore, the fall in the non-tradable price lowers the revenue from tourism 
exports, resulting in a decline in the welfare of residents.  Thus, strictly regulating the 
environment can yield a double dividend not only in narrowing the wage gap but also in 
promoting the welfare of the economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Using a general equilibrium framework, section 
2 discusses the effects of environmental control on wages and welfare under perfect and 
imperfect competition.  The optimal pricing rules of environmental regulation are then 
derived under both cases.  The conclusions are provided in section 3.   
 
2. The Model and Analysis 
We consider a small open economy that produces two goods: a traded good X1 and a non-
traded good X2.  Skilled labor (S) is used for the production of the traded good, while 
unskilled labor (L) is employed for the production of the non-traded good.  However, 
production of one unit of good i emits ei units of pollution.  This yields pollution emissions 
in sector i as: Zi = eiXi, and total pollution emissions in the economy is: Z = Z1 + Z2. The 
government regulates the environment by issuing Z units of tradable emission permits with 
unit price r.  Since firms need to pay for pollution emissions, we can treat them as a 
production input. Following Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006), the production functions of 
goods X1 and X2 are therefore written as: X1 = X1(S, Z1) and X2 = X2(L, Z2).  Let w1 and w2 
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be the skilled and unskilled wages. Choosing the traded good X1 as the numeraire, the 
relative price of the non-traded good X2 is denoted by p. 
The home economy consists of two types of consumers: domestic residents and 
foreign tourists. Domestic residents demand for both goods, denoted by Di, i = 1, 2, with 
quasi-linear preferences: u = U(D1,  D2, Z ) = D1 + v(D2) - M(Z), where vc > 0, Mc > 0 and u is 
the utility level.  This gives the demand functions for goods: D2 = D2(p) and D1 = I - pD2(p), 
where I denotes residents’ income. Due to quasi-linear preferences, residents’ demand for 
the non-traded good depends on its price only while the income effect falls entirely on the 
demand for the traded good.    As for tourists, they come and consume the unique goods 
produced in the economy. Following Copeland (1990), the locally produced non-traded 
good may capture this feature. Let *2D  be the tourist demand for good X2, depending on its 
price p and the shift parameter D.  Total demand for the non-traded good is given by D2 
+ *2D , which is in equilibrium equal to the domestic supply of the good:  
D2(p) + *2D (p, D) = X2,                                                        (1) 
where wD2/wp < 0 and w *2D /wp < 0.   
The budget constraint of the economy is described by the equality of consumption 
expenditure and production revenue by domestic residents. For this purpose, it is 
convenient to define the expenditure function of domestic residents as: E(1, p, Z, u) = min 
{D1 + pD2: u = D1 + v(D2) - M(Z)}, where u is the level of utility and Eu = 1 for quasi-linear 
preferences. Here Ep (= D2) denotes the compensated demand for the non-traded goods by 
residents and EZ > 0 measures the willingness to pay for pollution reductions or the 
marginal damage of pollution to domestic residents.  In equilibrium, the budget constraint 
of the economy is:   
 E(1, p, Z, u) = X1 + pX2.                                               (2) 
Note that from equations (1) and (2), we have the trade-balance condition: D1 – X1 = p *2D .   
That is, the import value of good X1 is equal to the export value of the non-traded good 
demanded by foreign tourists. The formally non-traded good produced in the economy can 
be therefore converted into the exportable good by tourism.  
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(a).  Perfect competition 
We consider the first case when both the markets of the traded and non-traded sectors are 
under perfect competition. The income distributional effect of environmental control can be 
examined by the cost structure of productions. In equilibrium, unit cost is equal to unit 
price: 
c1(w1, r) = 1,                                (3) 
c2(w2 , r) =  p,                                (4) 
where ci(  ) denotes the unit cost function of sector i, i = 1, 2. 
 Turning to the factor markets, the full-employment conditions of labor and pollution 
permits require: 
 1wc (w1, r)X1 = S,                       (5) 
2
wc (w2,, r)X2 = L,                       (6) 
1
rc (w1, r)X1 + 
2
rc (w2, r)X2  = Z,                     (7) 
where the subscript of the cost function denotes the partial derivative. By the envelope 
theorem, iwc  (= wci/wwi) represents the unit labor requirement and irc  (= wci/wr) is the unit 
pollution input for the production of good Xi. 
 Under perfect competition, the framework of the economy is block recursive: 
Equations (3) – (7) determine the variables of w1, w2, r, X1 and X2 as functions of Z and p, 
and then by equations (1) and (2) the non-tradable price p is a function of Z.  Specifically, 
the impact of environmental control on the skilled and unskilled wages can decomposed 
into the direct and the price-induced effects: 
dw1/dZ = ww1/wZ + (ww1/wp)(dp/dZ),                (8) 
dw2 /dZ = ww2/wZ + (ww2/wp)(dp/dZ).                      (9) 
Since the pollution input Z is the mobile factor between sectors, the direct effects of its 
change can be deduced from Figure 1, in which the value of the marginal product curve of 
Z is downward sloping. The initial price r of tradable emission is given by point A.  An 
increase in Z enlarges the horizontal axis and hence lowers its price as depicted at point Ac 
(i.e., wr/wZ < 0).  Because profits are zero under perfect competition, the lowered cost on 
pollution emission benefits both skilled and unskilled labor by raising their wages, ww1/wZ 
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> 0 and ww2/wZ > 0 according to equations (3) and (4).  In addition, we can use Figure 2 to 
illustrate the price-induced effects of the change in Z.  A rise in p shifts the marginal 
product curve of Z2 vertically, pushing up the price of pollution emission to point Bc (wr/wp 
> 0). This yields ww1/wp < 0 by equation (3). However, due to diminishing returns, the 
increase in r is less than the rise in p, implying that wr/wp < r/p in the specific-factor model.  
This results in ww2/wp > 0 by equation (4).2 
 To derive the price-induced effects, we need to determine the impact of 
environmental control on the price of the non-traded good. Differentiating the goods-
market equilibrium condition in equation (1), we obtain 
 dp/dZ = (wX2/wZ)/(wD2/wp + w *2D /wp - wX2/wp) < 0.                        (10) 
where, w *2D /wp < 0, wX2/wp > 0 and wX2/wZ > 0. Under the specific-factors framework, an 
increase in the pollution input raises the supply of the non-traded good and hence its price.  
It is noted that due to quasi-linear preferences, the income effect has no impact on the non-
tradable price. 
 By combining the direct and the price-induced effect in equations (8) and (9), we 
obtain the total effects of the change in pollution emissions on wages of skilled and 
unskilled labor. Since ww1/wp < 0, ww2/wp > 0 and dp/dZ < 0, the price-induced effect 
reinforces the positive direct effect on skilled wage but it mitigates the direct effect on 
unskilled wage. This results in dw1/dZ > 0 and dw2/dZ < 0. Thus, lax environmental control 
by increases in Z can widen the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.  
We examine next the welfare effect of pollution control on domestic residents.  
Totally differentiating equation (2) and then utilizing equation (1), we have 
 du/dZ =  r  – EZ  + *2D (dp/dZ).                          (11) 
Recall that r [= wX1/wZ1 = p(wX2/wZ2)] represents the contribution of the pollution input to 
production, while EZ expresses the direct marginal damage of pollution to domestic 
residents. In the absence of foreign tourists ( *2D  = 0), the optimal environmental control is 
to set the price of pollution emissions equal to its direct marginal damage to domestic 
residents (r = EZ).  However, in the presence of tourism ( *2D  > 0), the non-traded good 
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becomes exportable and thus gives a terms-of-trade effect from exporting tourism services. 
Nonetheless, an increase in pollution emissions lowers the price of the non-traded good, 
resulting in an unfavorable terms-of-trade effect as indicated in the last term of equation 
(11). Therefore, pollution control should be stricter when tourism presents in the economy.  
By setting du/dZ = 0 in equation (11), we obtain the optimal pollution control in terms of 
the permit price under perfect competition: 
rc  = EZ  - *2D (dp/dZ).                   (12) 
That is, to capture the terms-of-trade effect of exporting tourism services, the price of 
pollution permits should exceed the direct marginal damage of pollution to domestic 
residents.  In this case, a stricter control on emission permits is desirable for the economy 
with inbound tourism. 
    
(b).  Imperfect competition 
We now extend the discussion to the situation in which monopoly prevails in the non-
traded sector while perfect competition still remains in the traded sector. The profits of the 
monopolist in the non-traded sector are: S2 = pX2 - C2(w2, r, X2), where C2(w2, r, X2) is total 
cost of producing good X2.  Total cost consists of fixed cost F(r) and marginal cost m(w2, r); 
the former depends on the price of the pollution input only but the latter is a function of 
unskilled wage and the pollution price. This gives total cost of producing non-traded good 
X2: C2(w2, r, X2)= F(r) + m(w2, r)X2. 
On the demand side, due to quasi-linear preferences, demand for the non-traded 
good by domestic residents is given by D2 = D2(p). Total demand by domestic residents and 
foreign tourists must equal total supply of the non-traded good produced in the economy: 
X2 = D2(p) + *2D (p, D).  For a given tourist activity D, the price of good X2 set by the 
monopolist can be therefore expressed by p = p(X2), with pc = 1/(wD2/wp + w *2D /wp) < 0. 
Therefore, the first-order condition of profit maximization by the monopolist is given by 
the equality of marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost, as follows: 
p(X2) + pc(X2)X2 = m(w2, r).                       (4c) 
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Accordingly, we need to modify equations (6) and (7) on the employment conditions of 
unskilled labor and pollution input under the monopoly case:   
2
wC (w2,, r, X2) = L,                      (6c) 
1
rc (w1, r)X1 + 
2
rC (w2 , r, X2)  = Z.                    (7c) 
We then use the above production system of equations (3), (4c), (5), (6c) and (7c) to 
solve for the variables of w1, w2, r, X1 and X2 as functions of Z.  Because firms in the traded 
sector are price takers in the perfectly competitive market, the changes in skilled wages and 
pollution price must balance out to keep the unit cost constant. This can be seen from 
equation (1), as follows: 
1wˆ  = - (TZ1/TS1) rˆ ,                                          (13) 
where Tj1 represents the distributive share of factor j in sector 1 and “^” denotes the percent 
change of a variable.  However, the monopolist is the price setter in the non-traded sector, 
and the change in unskilled wages depends not only on the pollution price but also on the 
scale of production of good X2.  Totally differentiating equation (4c), we can obtain this 
result: 
 2wˆ  = - (
m
Z 2T / mL2T ) rˆ - [(2 + e)/Hb mL2T ] 2Xˆ ,                        (14) 
where b = m/p < 1 and mj 2T  represents the distributive share of factor j in sector 2’s 
marginal cost.  In addition, H  = - p/X2pc > 0, being the price elasticity of demand for the 
non-traded good, and e = X2ps/pc < 0, expressing the curvature of the total demand function 
for the non-traded good.  A rise in the supply of good X2 lowers its price and hence 
marginal revenue under the stability condition that 0 < 2 + e.3  Consequently, the reduction 
in marginal revenue leads to a fall in unskilled wages as stated in the last term of equation 
(14). 
 Since the pollution input is the mobile input, we can use Figure 3 to depict its price 
change, in which the initial price r is determined by the sector 1’s marginal product curve 
and the sector 2’s marginal revenue curve. An increase in Z enlarges the horizontal axis, 
thereby increasing output X2 and lowering the price to rc (i.e., 2Xˆ / Zˆ > 0 and Zr ˆ/ˆ < 0).4 
That is, an increase in the pollution permit always raises skilled wages ( 1wˆ / Zˆ > 0) by 
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equation (13) but it can weaken the favorable effect on unskilled wages ( 2wˆ / Zˆ  < 0) by 
equation (14) via the reduction in marginal revenue of producing good X2. Lax 
environmental control can therefore widen the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
labor when monopoly prevails in the non-traded sector.  
 We examine next the welfare effect of pollution control under monopoly. Totally 
differentiating equation (2) and then utilizing equation (1), we have 
 du/dZ =  r  – EZ  + *2D (dp/dZ) + (p – m)(dX2/dZ).             (15) 
The monopoly distortion in producing non-traded good X2 appears in the last term of 
equation (15). In the absence of tourism ( *2D = 0), the optimal permit price of emissions can 
be obtained by setting du/dZ = 0 in equation (15) as: r = EZ – (p – m)(dX2/dZ). Since the 
monopolistic output of X2 is below its competitive level, lower prices on emission permits 
are warranted for encouraging more production. Nevertheless, the presence of tourism 
contributes to the residents’ welfare via the exports of tourism services *2D . Accordingly, 
the optimal permit price of emissions is modified under monopoly to 
rm  = EZ  –  (p – m)(dX2/dZ)  - *2D (dp/dZ),              (16) 
where dp/dZ = pc(dX2/dZ) < 0.  If the gain on tourism exports exceeds the production loss of 
good X2, a stricter control on emissions (i.e., higher prices of emission permits than EZ) is 
still desirable in promoting the welfare of domestic residents for the economy with 
imperfect competition. 
    
3.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have utilized a specific-factors model to study the effects of 
environmental control on income distribution and residents’ welfare for an open economy 
with inbound tourism. The pollution input is considered as the mobile factor between 
sectors, and a rise in it raises the wages of skilled labor in the traded sector but can weaken 
the wages of unskilled labor in the non-traded sector. Thus, lax policy on environmental 
control can be a source of rising wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. In 
addition, loosened environmental control lowers the price of the non-traded good and thus 
reduces the revenue of tourism exports. Stricter control on pollution emissions can 
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therefore yield a double dividend not only in narrowing the wage gap but also in promoting 
residents’ welfare. However, for improving the production efficiency of the non-traded 
good sector, permit prices of emissions may need to be lower under imperfect competition. 
 
Footnotes 
1. Tourism growth can also lead to a higher growth rate in the economy although there is some 
evidence that this may not always be the case.  See, for example, Chao et al. (2008). 
2. See Jones (1971) for these comparative-static results under specific-factors models. 
3. Marginal revenue of producing additional good X2 is: MR = p + X2pc, and the change in it is:     
dMR/dX2 = pc(2 + e).  The stability condition, 0 < 2 + e, is derived in the appendix. 
4. The derivations are provided in the appendix. 
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Appendix 
Totally differentiating equations (3), (4’), (5), (6’) and (7’), we have the changes of 
equations under monopoly:  
 0 = TS1 1wˆ  + TZ1 rˆ ,          
 - (2 + e) 2Xˆ = Hb mL2T 2wˆ + Hb mL2T rˆ ,               
 1Xˆ  - sS1 1wˆ  + sS1 rˆ  = 0, 
 2Xˆ - 
m
Ls 2 2wˆ + 
m
Ls 2 rˆ  = 0, 
 OZ1 1Xˆ  + mZ 2O 2Xˆ + sZ1 1wˆ  + mZs 2 2wˆ - (sZ1 + sZ2) rˆ = Zˆ , 
where Oji is the employment share of factor j in sector i (cf. Jones, 1965).  Note that sS1 = 
V1TZ1OS1, where V1 = 1111 / rwwr cccc , etc.  Letting a dot over a variable denote the time 
derivative, the adjustments of the system can be expressed as 
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The principal minors of the above coefficient matrices are: 
 '1 = 0, 
 '2 = 0, 
 '3 = - TS1(2 + e), 
 '4 = TS1[Hb mL2T  + sL2(2 + e)] 
'5 = - TS1TZ1( mZs 2  + sL2 mZ 2O ) – (sS1OZ1 + sZ1TZ1)[Hb mL2T  + sL2(2 + e)].  
The D-stability requires that the odd principal minors are non-positive and the even 
principal minors are non-negative (Quirk and Saposnik, 1968, p. 166).  Hence, we need that 
2 + e > 0 to assure '3 < 0, '4 > 0 and '5 < 0 for stability. 
 Solving the above changes of equations, we obtain the following comparative-static 
results: 
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 1Xˆ / Zˆ = - sS1[Hb mL2T  + sL2(2 + e)]/'5 > 0, 
 2Xˆ / Zˆ = - HbsS2TS1( mL2T  + mZ 2T )/'5 > 0, 
 1wˆ / Zˆ = - TZ1[Hb mL2T  + sL2(2 + e)]/'5 > 0, 
2wˆ / Zˆ = - TS1[Hb mZ 2T  - sL2(2 + e)]/'5  0, 
 rˆ / Zˆ = TS1[Hb mL2T  + sL2(2 + e)]/'5 < 0. 
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